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Principal-Agent Problem

When decision rights are delegated, agents optimise their own payoff under information asymmetry. Without smart contracts and governance, effort, risk and horizon drift away from the principal’s goals.
Author

Economics/contract theory (Jensen–Meckling; Akerlof; Holmström)

model type
,
about

This shows up any time one party acts on another’s behalf — executives for shareholders, sales reps for a firm, contractors for clients. Agents know more about their actions than principals do, and they optimise for their own payoff. The model gives simple levers to close that gap: incentives, visibility, risk-sharing, and selection.

How it works

Different goals – pay, status, workload vs long-term firm value.
Information gaps – agent effort/quality is hard to observe.
Hidden action – risk-taking or shirking after the deal (moral hazard).
Hidden info – weak agents/projects select into rich terms (adverse selection).
Horizon & risk mismatch – short bonuses vs long outcomes; agents bear undiversified risk.
Metric distortion – pay one KPI, get that KPI (and collateral damage).

use-cases

Executive & sales compensation – equity/vesting, quota design, clawbacks.
Asset management – GP–LP fees, carry, high-water marks, hurdles.
Franchising & platforms – brand standards, audits, rating systems.
Outsourcing/procurement – SLAs, penalties/bonuses, termination rights.
Insurance & lending – deductibles, covenants, monitoring.
M&A integration – earn-outs, retention and founder handover risk.
Public sector – contractor incentives vs service quality; PPPs.

How to apply

Define the true outcome you want (not just a proxy metric).
Map what the agent controls and what you can observe.
Pick pay mix – fixed vs variable; tie variable to outcomes you can verify; add deferral/clawback where needed.
Add visibility – SLAs, sampling, audits, customer scores; fewer, clearer measures.
Align horizon & risk – vesting/hold rules, caps/floors, co-investment.
Select well – references, trials, reputation signals; avoid adverse selection.
Review and iterate – watch for gaming; adjust metrics and rules.

pitfalls & cautions

Paying the proxy – targets hit, mission missed (Goodhart).
Short-termism – annual bonuses that burn long-term value.
All-variable or all-fixed pay – misaligned risk sharing; mix matters.
One-metric comp – multitasking distortion; include quality/satisfaction/sustainability.
Over-monitoring – kills autonomy and intrinsic motivation; use trust + verification.
Adverse selection via rich terms – the wrong agents self-select into your scheme.